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WHY BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION STILL SURVIVES
J. GORDON HYLTON*
Although the Curt Flood Act' technically limits professional base-
ball's antitrust immunity, the statute actually reconfirms the sport's sev-
enty-five year old exemption to the federal antitrust laws. By abrogating
only that part of the immunity that applies to labor relations at the major
league level, the statute implicitly (and explicitly) leaves intact the re-
mainder of the immunity. The remarkable feature of the Flood Act is
not what it did, but what it did not do.
The Flood Act does seal the coffin of the perpetual reserve clause
that from the 1880s to the 1970s completely restricted the ability of ma-
jor league players to move from one team to another in search of higher
wages or a preferred playing environment. Had this act been in effect in
1970 when Curt Flood filed his famous lawsuit against major league
baseball, Flood would almost certainly have prevailed.2 However, in
1999, the statute has no practical effect. As any knowledgeable baseball
fan knows, the ability of the major league owners to impose restrictions
of this sort on their players has been a dead letter since the McNally-
Messersmith Arbitration of 1975.1 What major league baseball players
could not obtain in the courtroom, they have won at the bargaining ta-
ble. While a limited form of the reserve rule remains in place in major
league baseball-it still applies to players with less than six years experi-
ence in the majors-it exists as part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and with the approval of the Major League Baseball Players
Association.4 In 1971, Michael Jacobs and Ralph Winter predicted that
the role of antitrust law in professional sport labor relations was coming
* Interim Director, National Sports Law Institute.
1. The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824.
2. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
3. For the general history of labor-management relations in baseball, see LEE LOWENFiSH,
THE IMPERFECr DiAMoND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS (Rev. ed. 1980) &
JoiHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL (1994).
4. The Major League Baseball Players Association under the leadership of Marvin Miller
actually preferred a partial retention of the reserve clause as a way of insuring that the market
not be flooded (no pun intended) by free agents. See MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DImFERFNT
BALL GAmF: THm SPORT AND Busnmss OF BASEBALL 258-59 (1991); HELYAR, supra note 3,
at 181-82.
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to an end.5 It seems quite likely, given the progress that the Major
League Baseball Players Association had made between 1966 and 1975,
that the players would have eventually have secured significant modifi-
cations, if not the outright termination, of the reserve system without
either the Flood lawsuit, the above mentioned arbitrations, or the Curt
Flood Act.6
The limited effect of the Curt Flood statute raises the question of
why Congress has steadfastly refused to abolish baseball's antitrust ex-
emption even though the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the anomalous (and allegedly illogical) character of the exemption
(which does not extend to other professional team sports).7 Labeled a
"walking zombie" in 1949, the exemption will clearly survive into the
21st century.8
Neither Congressional inertia nor the power of Organized Baseball
can explain the persistence of this exemption. When Congress has felt
the need to modify the application of antitrust rules to professional
sports it has been able to do so quite expeditiously.9 Moreover, for all its
power and influence, the National Football League has never been able
to persuade Congress to grant it an exemption of the type enjoyed by
Major League Baseball.10
The key to understanding the persistence of baseball's antitrust ex-
emption is the fact that the exemption applies not just to Major League
Baseball but to a much more complex entity known as Organized Base-
ball. Unlike the National Football League, the National Basketball As-
5. Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining: Of
Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L. J. 1 (1971). The availability of the decertification option
has arguably prolonged the life of antitrust actions in the realm of sports labor-management
relations beyond what Jacobs and Winter predicted. Under this approach, a players' union
"decertifies" itself as the proper collective bargaining representative of its constituents who
then file an antitrust action against their employers (who are no longer protected by the non-
statutory exemption from the federal antitrust laws). Although this approach has been tried
by the players of the National Football League and was contemplated during the recent NBA
lockout, the viability of this tactic is questionable. See generally, PAUL C. WEILER & GARY
R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 204-11 (2nd ed. 1998).
6. See supra notes 3-4.
7. Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
S. The quotation is from Judge Jerome Frank's opinion in Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d
402 (2nd. Cir. 1949), at 408-09.
9. See for example, Sports Broadcasting Act (1961); AFL-NFL Merger Act (1966); and
the Curt Flood Act (1998).
10. For the history of National Football League efforts to lobby Congress on behalf of a
more favorable antitrust position, see LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESsiNAL SPORTS AND THE LAW
33-54, 381-92 (1979) & DAVID HARMIs, THE LEAGUE: THE RIsE AND DECLINm OF THE NFL
(1986).
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sociation, and the National Hockey League which operate as self-
contained entities, Major League Baseball is merely one part of an elab-
orate structure of leagues bound together contractually by the National
Agreement (also known as the Major-Minor League Agreement)."
Under this arrangement several hundred teams playing in several dozens
of leagues agree to abide by common rules designed to insure the eco-
nomic viability of all members. From the time of the first National
Agreement in 1883, member teams and leagues have agreed to respect
the territorial rights of other teams and to refrain from competing for the
services of players except by those rules specifically set out in the
agreement.
Key to the operation of this system have been the concepts of league
classification, salary caps, and reserved rights to players. Minor leagues
are classified at different levels based on the population of the member
teams, and players are expected to advance from lower classifications to
higher ones (and eventually to the Major Leagues) if their abilities war-
rant. Minor league players are normally paid at a fixed rate depending
on the classification of the league, and team owners have generally been
prohibited from paying salaries in excess of the allotted amount.' 2
Independent minor league teams, once the dominant type but now
relatively rare, have the right to sell their players to other teams and are
thus protected from losing their entire investment in a player once his
contract expires. On the other hand, to gain this level of protection, mi-
nor league teams have long permitted higher ranking teams to "draft"
their players at the end of every season (which has the effect of a forced
sale at a price set by the agreement). Minor league teams which are
affiliated with major league teams ("farm clubs") typically do not control
the contracts of their players but receive players on assignment from ma-
jor league organizations. This system obviously reduces the labor costs
of minor league teams, but operates only because the major league team
has the power to recall the player at any time and may assign him to
another team. Major league teams can afford to have large numbers of
minor league players under contract at any given time because of the low
fixed salaries and because other teams are prohibited from bidding for
11. AGREEMENT OF THE NATIONAL AssOCATION OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
LEAGUES (1987).
12. For a description of the structure of minor league baseball, see ANDREv ZimALIsT,
BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LooK INSIDE THE BIG BusIEss OF OUR NATIONAL
PASTnAE 179-80 (1992).
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the services of these players. 13 To guarantee compliance, players who
refuse to accept approved contracts are prohibited from playing on any
team in any affiliated league and any team that would attempt to sign
such a player is subject to expulsion from Organized Baseball. Since
1965, North American amateur players have been subject to a major
league draft which has the effect of limiting to one the number of teams
with which an amateur player can negotiate with at any given time.
(Prior to 1965, players who had never signed a professional contract had
the right to negotiate with any major [or minor] league team).
Obviously, such a system raises serious antitrust problems, relying as
it does on rules granting team's exclusive territorial rights and restricting
the freedom of players to sell their services on the open market. On the
other hand, the structure of Organized Baseball has long been accepted
by the American public and the sporting public which has rarely com-
plained about the way in which it restricts the occupational mobility of
players. Moreover, the belief that minor league baseball is a proper test-
ing ground for young players and a place of respite for players near the
end of their career is deeply ingrained in the landscape of American
sports. On top of this, most fans, and probably most players, have ac-
cepted the conventional wisdom that the stability of professional base-
ball has been possible only because of these very restrictions.
Whether the structure of Organized Baseball could have survived
without such restrictions is difficult to say, in part because there were so
few challenges to it in the first half of the twentieth century. The 1903
National Agreement, which marked peace between the National League
and affiliated minor leagues and the upstart American League, ushered
in a period of remarkable stability. Whereas team failures had been
quite common in the nineteenth century, from 1903 until 1953, no major
league team went out of business or even relocated to a new city. The
only serious effort to establish a major league outside the parameters of
the National Agreement-the Federal League of 1914 and 1915-ended
with the termination of the League and the absorption of several of the
league owners into the existing structure. Although there was always a
fairly high degree of turnover in minor league franchises, the minor
leagues survived two world wars and a Great Depression. A few of the
higher ranking leagues (the International League, the American Associ-
13. Rules now permit a limited form of minor league free agency, but only for those play-
ers who have played more than six years in the minor leagues and who have not been placed
on a major league roster. While it is possible for major league teams to draft the minor league
players of another team, rules requiring drafted players to be added immediately to the major
league roster of the existing team make this a rarely exercised option.
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ation, the Pacific Coast League, the Southern Association, and the Texas
League) operated continuously throughout the same period. With only
a few small disruptions, the minor leagues continued to develop players
for the majors. Although Minor League Baseball was always a finan-
cially risky venture (at least at the level of the lower minors), there were
no serious internal challenges to the existing system, and until recently,
only a handful of professional leagues attempted to operate without the
benefits of the National Agreement.'4
In the governmental arena, it has been the unwillingness of Congress
and the Supreme Court to risk the consequences of subjecting the struc-
ture of Organized Baseball to the federal antitrust laws that has pro-
longed the life of baseball's antitrust exemption. That there would be no
governmental interference or tampering with the basic structure of Or-
ganized Baseball became apparent in the 1950s when the sport's business
and labor practices were subjected to unprecedented public scrutiny.
At mid-century, the fate of the exemption seemed anything but set-
tled. In fact, when minor league pitcher George Toolson filed an anti-
trust action against Organized Baseball in 1950, there was every reason
to believe that the federal courts would let his challenge proceed. The
conceptual underpinnings of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs et al.,'5 the 1922 United
States Supreme Court decision which had held that baseball was not a
form of interstate commerce, had been seriously eroded by the Court's
expanded definition of interstate commerce in the 1930s and 1940s and
by the post-1922 increase in interstate radio and television broadcasting
of baseball games.' 6 In 1949, the United States Circuit Court for the
Second Circuit had held that these factors meant that baseball was no
longer exempt from antitrust actions. Afraid of an adverse Supreme
Court decision, Organized Baseball had chosen not to appeal the ruling
but instead settled the case brought by former New York Giants out-
fielder Danny Gardella who had been blacklisted for signing a contract
with the independent Mexican League while still under reserve to the
14. For one such example, see R.G. UTLEY & ScoTT VERNER, Tim INDEPENDENT CARO.
LINA BASEBALL LEAGUE, 1936-38: BASEBALL OumT-ws (1998). In recent years, the number
of independent minor leagues has risen dramatically. In 1992, there were no such leagues; in
1996, there were eight. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 634-36 (LLOYD JOHN-
SON & MILES WOLrF, eds., 2nd ed., 1996).
15. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
16. For an example of the expanded definition of commerce, see United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In that case, the Supreme Court re-
versed several earlier cases in which it had ruled that the sale of insurance did not constitute
interstate commerce.
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Giants. 17 Moreover, in the late 1940s, the United States Justice Depart-
ment had begun an investigation of the antitrust implications of major
league baseball's broadcasting policies without any apparent concern
about baseball's immunity. (In fact, rather than contest the authority of
the Justice Department, Major League Baseball agreed to modify its
broadcasting rules to comply with the Justice Department's requests.) 18
In addition, scholarly opinion seemed clearly of the view that the exemp-
tion should be abolished.' 9
Buoyed by the belief that Organized Baseball was no longer immune
from antitrust liability, a number of disgruntled minor league players
and officials decided to follow Gardella's example and filed antitrust ac-
tions. By July of 1951, eight such cases were pending in federal courts.
That same month, the Subcommittee on Monopoly Power of the House
Judiciary Committee began hearings on the baseball business. The Sub-
Committee was chaired by Brooklyn Congressman Emmanuel Celler
who was on record as saying, "[i]f baseball is illegal, then we must prose-
cute the owners or change the law."20
The issue returned to the United States Supreme Court in 1953 when
the court heard the case of minor league pitcher George Toolson. Tool-
son had pitched for the Newark Bears of the International League in
1949, a AAA (the highest minor league level) affiliate of the New York
Yankees. The Yankees dropped their affiliation with Newark the follow-
ing year, and Toolson was reassigned to Binghampton of the Class A
Eastern League, a team two levels lower than his previous team. Tool-
son refused to report to Binghampton and tried to obtain a position with
a team in the AAA Pacific Coast League. However, in May of 1950, he
was placed on the ineligible list which prevented him from entering into
a contract with any other major league organization or minor league
team. In response to his blacklisting, Toolson filed an antitrust action
against the Yankees and Organized Baseball in California.2'
Toolson's lawsuit struck at the heart of the structure of professional
baseball in the United States, since he was effectively challenging the
17. Gardella v. Chandler,79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); judgment reversed by 172 F.2d
402 (2nd Cir. 1949).
18. For an account of this episode, see SOBEL, supra note 10, at 577-78.
19. See for example, Jay H. Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sport, 58 YALE L. J. 691
(1949) & John Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. Cm. L. R~v. 56 (1949).
20. LowvENmsH, supra note 3, at 174.
21. Facts pertaining to the Toolson case are taken from the Supreme Court's opinion and
from the official record submitted with the briefs. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953).
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right of Organized Baseball to place restrictions on the mobility of play-
ers. Unfortunately, for Toolson, those who had predicted that the
Supreme Court would abolish baseball's antitrust immunity were prema-
ture in their judgment. In a brief, per curium opinion signed by seven
justices, the Supreme Court dismissed Toolson's claim on the ground
that Organized Baseball did not fall within the ambit of the antitrust
laws.22
The extent to which the Supreme Court's Toolson decision changed
the rationale for baseball's exemption has not been fully appreciated. In
Federal Baseball, Justice Holmes had found that the movement of play-
ers from one state to another for the purpose of playing of baseball
games did not constitute "commerce" in the constitutional sense. By
1953, the Court no longer defined commerce so narrowly, and the Tool-
son court did not attempt to reaffirm the rationale of the earlier decision.
Instead, it pronounced that "[w]ithout re-examination of the underlying
issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of [Federal
Baseball] so far as that decision determines that Congress had no inten-
tion of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws."'  Federal Baseball in fact had said nothing about Con-
gress' intent when it enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 or the Clayton
Act in 1914. While it is true that the Congressional debates reveal no
evidence of an intent to include baseball within the scope of the new
statute, that was not Holmes' point. According to Holmes, baseball was
not commerce, and Congress therefore could not have made it subject to
the antitrust laws even if it had chosen to do so. By redefining the hold-
ing in Federal Baseball, by insinuating that it was Congress and not the
Court that had created baseball's immunity, the Court tossed the issue
back to Congress.
Why were seven of the nine Supreme Court justices in 1953 unwilling
to subject baseball to the antitrust laws? The only policy justification
hinted at in the majority opinion was the fact that the industry had been
allowed to develop for the past thirty years "on the understanding that it
was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. ' 24 The brief fied by Ma-
jor League Baseball and an amicus brief filed by the Boston Red Sox of
the American League do, however, offer an indication as what argu-
22. Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Toolson's case was combined with two others.
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1952); Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953); & Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428
(6th Cir. 1953).
23. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356-57 [Emphasis added].
24. Id. at 356.
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ments may have persuaded the Court to find that Congress had never
intended baseball to be subject to the antitrust laws. Rather than focus
on the technical question of the continuing validity of Federal Baseball's
determination that baseball was not commerce, both briefs argued that
the unique character of Organized Baseball required that it receive spe-
cial consideration under the antitrust laws. While free competition was
generally a positive good, the briefs acknowledged, they insisted that
baseball could not continue to operate without some restriction on com-
petition for player services. As the amicus brief concluded: "The unique
and anomalous characteristics of the baseball enterprise is therefore in
itself a reason for not applying to the full extent of their possible literary
scope the broad general phrases invoked by the petitioner."'  By hold-
ing that Congress had not intended to include baseball under the anti-
trust laws, the Court was in effect accepting just such an argument. As a
appellate strategy, the approach of Major League Baseball in arguing its
case in Toolson was unconventional, but it worked.
Once the issue returned to Congress, the unwillingness of elected of-
ficials to risk shaking the foundations of Organized Baseball became
even more apparent. The Celler Committee had concluded its investiga-
tions in May of 1952 on a somewhat convoluted note. The Committee's
hearings had revealed that there was much greater dissatisfaction with
the failure of Major League Baseball to expand into new cities than
there was with baseball's labor practices. In fact, with only a handful of
exceptions, most of the players who testified before the subcommittee
expressed a belief that the reserve clause was necessary for the survival
of the industry.26 The Committee concluded that a blanket immunity to
the antitrust laws should not be granted to baseball but at the same time
decided that the reserve system should not be outlawed by legislation,
finding that "professional baseball could not operate successfully and
profitably without some form of reserve clause."'27 Assuming that the
Supreme Court would not uphold Federal Baseball, the Committee felt
that the proper next step was to test baseball's reserve rules under the
"rule of reason" test applied in antitrust cases.2s
25. Id. Amicus Brief filed by the Boston Red Sox on behalf of the American League, at
16.
26. For a discussion of the Celler Committee hearings, see G. EDWARD Wurr, CREATING
THE NAnONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS ITSELF: 1903-1953, 299-309 (1996).
27. Organized Basebalk" Report of the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H. REP. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. at
228 (1952).
28. See id. at 231.
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However, once the Supreme Court handed down its Toolson deci-
sion, Congress undertook no serious efforts to modify the Court's deci-
sion or to implement the modest recommendations of the Celler
Committee. The apparent consensus, confirmed by the Celler Commit-
tee report, that some form of reserve system was essential for the contin-
ued economic viability of the sport, suggested that there was no urgent
need for reform particularly since baseball was no longer banning play-
ers for past breaches of the reserve clause as it had been doing at the
time of the Gardella incident. Moreover, there were legitimate reasons
to believe that the elimination of restrictions on player movement would
destroy whatever competitive balance that remained at the major league
level. Eight days before the Toolson case was argued in October 1953,
the New York Yankees, Major League Baseball's wealthiest and most
successful team, had captured its unprecedented fifth consecutive World
Series championship. In an era where the cry of "Break up the
Yankees" was a common refrain, it hardly made sense to open up the
marketplace. While the elimination of the reserve system might have
hurt the Yankees in the long run by allowing other teams to raid its tal-
ent-laden farm system, in the short run it would allow the sport's strong-
est team to become even stronger by outbidding its rivals for their best
players.2 9
Furthermore, the principal complaint voiced during the Celler hear-
ings, i.e., that Organized Baseball had too narrowly restricted the geo-
graphic location of major league teams, was addressed by the major
league owners. In 1952, the Pacific Coast League was reclassified from
AAA to "Open," a specially created designation intended to enhance
the possibility of that league becoming a third major league. More im-
portantly, between 1953 and 1957, five teams from existing multi-team
cities (Boston, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and New York) moved to new
locations (Milwaukee, Baltimore, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco) resulting in the first new major league cities since 1903.
An even more compelling reason to leave baseball alone was the
steady decline of minor league baseball in the 1950s, a fact that was be-
coming clear by the time that the issue returned to the Congress. In
29. In the four seasons from 1949 through 1952, the Yankees drew a total of 8 million fans
in an era when ticket sales still accounted for the lion's share of baseball revenue. With 7
million in attendance, only Cleveland approached the New York total, and only three other
teams (Detroit, Brooklyn, and the Boston Red Sox) exceeded 5 million. The poorest drawing
team, the St. Louis Browns, drew only 1.3 million fans over the four years. Totals calculated
from yearly attendance figures presented in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,
supra note 14, at 378, 389, 400 & 412.
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1949, there had been 59 minor leagues in 438 cities, and nearly 42 million
fans turned out for minor league games that year. Two years later, the
number of leagues had dropped to 50, and attendance had fallen by
more than 35% to 27 million. Initially, this drop was attributed to the
Korean War, but the end of the war did not stop the decline.30 By 1957,
the number of minor leagues had dropped to 28 while total attendance
fell to 15.5 million. By 1959, seven more leagues had folded.31 In the
face of new entertainment options, minor league baseball seemed unable
to compete in many venues. In 1956, Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick
appointed a "Save the Minors Committee," and the following year a half
million dollar stabilization fund was established to help shore up the
lower minors.32
In this climate, in which the institution of minor league baseball was
valued more in the abstract than in the particular, the idea of severing
the slender thread (control of labor costs) that enabled minor league
baseball to survive was hardly attractive. Even with the 1950's shake out
there were still minor league teams in most states, and few Congressmen
wanted to bear the blame for their demise.
Nevertheless, the issue of baseball's antitrust exemption was brought
back on to the Congressional table by another Supreme Court decision.
In Radovich v. National Football League,33 the Court reaffirmed its Tool-
son holding as to baseball, but refused to extend the exemption to pro-
fessional football. The Radovich decision reiterated the special status of
baseball, and cited the acquiescence of Congress to the exemption as
proof that it should not be overturned by judicial decision. In his opin-
ion for the majority, Justice Thomas Clark explained,
The Court did this [upheld the exemption in Toolson] because it
was concluded that more harm would be done in overruling Fed-
eral Baseball than in upholding a ruling which at best was of dubi-
ous validity. Vast efforts had gone into the development and
organization of baseball since that decision and enormous capital
had been invested in reliance on its permanence. Congress had
chosen to make no change.34
Although the Court went no further in its explanation, this was another
way of saying that the National Football League did not need an anti-
30. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 14, at 347.
31. See id. at 100-101; SOBEL, supra note 10, at 582.
32. See id. at 411. On the decline of the minor leagues in the 1950's more generally, see
NEIL J. SULLIVAN, TmE MINORS 235-55 (1991).
33. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
34. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MINOR LEAGuE BASEBALL, supra note 14, at 450.
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trust exemption since it was only a single league, rather than a coalition
of leagues arranged in a tight hierarchical structure, as was the case with
Organized Baseball. (In 1957, the average major league team either op-
erated or had exclusive working agreements with ten minor league teams
and had between 200 and 300 players under contract. The typical NFL
team had fewer than 40.35) There were no farm systems at all in profes-
sional football and basketball; only hockey, whose players in this era
were drawn exclusively from Canada, had a minor league system in any
way resembling minor league baseball.
Even so, football executives responded to Radovich by lobbying
Congress for an antitrust exemption comparable to that of baseball. The
House Antitrust Committee conducted new hearings in 1957, and the
following summer, the full House passed an amendment to the antitrust
laws that exempted baseball, football, basketball, and hockey in regard
to rules relating to competitive balance (like the reserve clause), territo-
rial exclusivity, and the integrity of the sport.36 Rather than modify
baseball's exemption, this bill would have extended its most important
features to other sports.37 The Senate Judiciary Committee held hear-
ings on the bill, but the proposal died in its Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly.3
A bill that specifically targeted baseball's organizational structure
was introduced in February 1959 by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver.
Kefauver's bill provided antitrust exemptions for most activities under-
taken by professional sports leagues, but specifically denied the exemp-
tion to any baseball team that controlled more than 80 players at one
time. A revised version of his bill lowered the level to 40 players.
Although it appeared to have been advanced for the benefit of minor
league players, Kefauver's bill was actually motivated by the belief that
the large number of players under contract to major league teams pre-
vented the creation of new independent major leagues. In fact, at the
time the bill was introduced, legendary baseball executive Branch
Rickey and others were in the process of organizing the Continental
35. See id. at 452.
36. Hearings on H.R. 5307, et al., Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
37. For a discussion of the process by which this bill passed in the House of Representa-
tives, see SOBEL, supra note 10, at 38-41.
38. See Hearings on H.R. 10378 and S. 4070 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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League which was intended to be a third major league. 9 However, none
of Kefauver's proposals passed either house of Congress, and the Conti-
nental League effort was abandoned once Organized Baseball an-
nounced that the number of major league teams would be expanded
from 16 to 20 in 1961 and 1962.40
Although concern that Organized Baseball was abusing its privileged
position under the antitrust laws never disappeared completely, by the
early 1960s, it was clear that there was no Congressional support at all
for a complete repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption. Nearly 40 years
later, the situation has not changed. While representatives from areas
where there is dissatisfaction with the policies of Organized Baseball
(particularly in regard to the location of major league franchises) still
threaten to repeal the exemption, such threats are designed to influence
baseball policies, and are not motivated by a true desire to do away with
the immunity. An elaborate minor league structure still distinguishes
baseball from other sports; the romance of minor league baseball re-
mains secure (now epitomized by the movie "Bull Durham"); and as the
debate over the Curt Flood Act revealed, Congress has no intention of
jeopardizing the future of baseball's traditional structure by subjecting it
to antitrust scrutiny.
39. On the Continental League, see JAMES QuiR & RODNEY D. FORT, PAYDIRr THE
BusiNEss OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 319-20 (1992).
40. For a discussion of Kefauver's bills and other legislative efforts during the 86th Con-
gress, see SOBEL, supra note 10, at 41-48.
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